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ABSTRACT 
I examine how information choice within financial disclosures interacts with the screen size used 
to view the disclosure (traditional computer or small mobile device size) to influence investors’ 
estimates of fundamental value. One proposed solution to concerns of investors’ increasing 
information processing costs is providing information choice within financial disclosures, 
meaning investors have the flexibility to choose the sections and order of information to read 
within the disclosure. However, theory suggests processing costs could increase, rather than 
decrease, if the disclosure is viewed on a smaller screen mobile device, which is an emerging 
technology used by investors. Consistent with predictions, results of an experiment show that 
high information choice positively affects investors’ effort and information integration when 
estimating fundamental value if the disclosure is viewed on a traditional screen. Conversely, high 
information choice negatively affects investors’ effort and information integration if viewed on a 
small screen. These findings suggest screen size could be an important moderator of some 
disclosure presentation effects, which is increasingly important as more investors use mobile 
devices to access, read, and trade on financial information. My findings also caution firms and 
regulators about expanding the use of disclosures providing information choice without 
considering the screen size used to access the disclosure.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulators, accounting firms, and academics are concerned that growing disclosure 
volume is increasing investors’ information processing costs (Ernst and Young 2014; KPMG 
2011; SEC 2013), causing investors to allocate capital less efficiently (Lawrence 2014; Miller 
2010) and delaying the impounding of information into price (You and Zhang 2009, Cohen and 
Lou 2010). Investors’ increasing use of smaller screen mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, 
wireless PDAs, etc.) to access and read financial disclosures is likely intensifying the problem. 
Small screens display disclosures in a variable spatial layout, so information is even more 
difficult to process than when displayed in a fixed spatial layout (i.e. traditional computer size 
screen). One proposed solution is leveraging Internet technology to change the presentation of 
disclosures for both mobile and traditional device access. Specifically, some suggest providing 
information choice within disclosures, which I define as providing investors the flexibility to 
choose the sections and order of information to read within the disclosure, is an especially 
mobile friendly presentation option (PR Newswire 2013). However, theory suggests that high 
information choice together with a variable spatial layout (i.e. small screen) could increase, 
rather than decrease, processing costs and negatively impact investors’ judgments. In this study I 
examine how information choice within disclosures interacts with spatial layout (operationalized 
as screen size) to influence investors’ estimates of fundamental value.  
Firms vary in whether they provide information choice within disclosures. Traditionally 
firms provide all information in a continuous PDF or web-based document so after investors 
choose to read a disclosure, they make no further choices within the disclosure. For example, 
Apple’s 2015 third quarter press release is a web-based disclosure containing all information on 
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continuous pages. Other firms are increasingly providing information choice within disclosures. 
For example, Microsoft’s 2015 fourth quarter press release splits information into clickable tabs. 
The top of the page includes tabs linking to the press release and webcast, financial statements, 
performance narrative, KPIs, and segment results (Appendix A contains examples of high and 
low choice disclosures). Investors may choose the sections and order of information they want to 
read by clicking on the tabs. Firms are providing information choice within a variety of other 
disclosures, including annual reports, press releases, proxy statements (Lin 2015), and SEC 
disclosures (SEC 2015). Further, newswires now offer high choice disclosures, consulting firms 
continue to promote their use, and investors increasingly request them (Business Wire 2014; PR 
Newswire 2014; Roach 2014). Many of these disclosures are designed to maintain information 
choice functionality when accessed on mobile devices. 
Investors increasingly use mobile devices to access, read, and trade on financial 
information (Fidelity 2014). For example, in 2014 mobile devices accounted for 25% of visits to 
investor relations websites (Roach 2014) and 25% of visits to PR Newswire press releases, and 
in 2015, these types of mobile visits are expected to increase to 50% and 31%, respectively (PR 
Newswire 2014a, b; Roach 2014). Further, in a recent survey, Fidelity investors reported 
performing sophisticated investing tasks on mobile financial apps, including technical research 
(43%), fundamental research/reading analyst reports (44%), and trading (41%) at least once a 
month. Overall, major brokerage houses estimate that 15% to 20% of all retail trades are now 
coming from mobile devices (Carey 2014; Patel 2014), ultimately impacting market activity 
(Brown, Elliott, and White 2014; Brown, Stice, and White 2015).  
One of the most noticeable and fundamental differences between mobile devices and 
personal computers (i.e. desktops and laptops) is the smaller physical screen size. Computers 
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have an average screen size of 11 to 27 inches while mobile phones have an average screen size 
of just 3 to 6 inches. Smaller screens display less of a document at one time, relative to a 
traditional larger screen, and thus require incremental scrolling to read a document. Further, 
information is no longer in a fixed spatial location. Instead, information is in a variable spatial 
location as it could appear at the top or bottom of the screen, depending on how much scrolling 
the reader has completed. Variable spatial layouts increase the difficulty of relocating or 
recalling information and integrating information from various locations in a document (Piolat et 
al. 1997). In other words, a small screen increases investors’ processing costs.  
I draw on prior information processing research to develop my predictions. Decision 
makers adapt their information processing effort based on features of the task, including 
attributes of information displays (Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993; Payne 1982; Payne et al. 
1993). Specifically, decision makers trade off the benefits and costs of exerting effort to process 
information. Attributes of information displays, such as information choice and spatial layout 
(hereafter screen size), affect the benefits and costs of exerting effort.1 I predict that actively 
choosing the sections and order of information to view in a high choice disclosure on a 
traditional screen encourages investors to exert more effort, so their estimates of fundamental 
value reflect more information integration. However, making choices and navigating small 
screens both draw on the same pool of limited resources necessary to engage in effortful 
processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008). In other words, high choice together with 
small screens increase the costs of exerting effort. Therefore, I expect investors will exert less 
effort when they view disclosures with high choice on a small screen, ultimately causing 
estimates of fundamental value to reflect less information integration. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I refer to the construct of spatial layout at the operational level (i.e. screen size) throughout the paper for 
expositional simplicity.  
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To test my predictions, I use a 2 x 2 + 1 between-subjects experimental design, 
manipulating information choice and spatial layout (i.e. screen size). In the experiment, graduate 
business student participants assume the role of prospective investors evaluating information 
provided in a press release about a firm to estimate its fundamental value. I manipulate 
information choice by providing all press release sections on tabs which participants can 
navigate sequentially by clicking on “next” and “back” buttons (“low choice”) or allowing 
participants to choose the sections and order of the press release they view via clickable tabs 
(“high choice”). I manipulate spatial layout (i.e. screen size) by presenting the press release in a 
traditional computer size box (“fixed spatial layout”) or a small mobile device size box 
(“variable spatial layout”) on the computer screen. To enhance external validity, I also run an 
additional small screen condition where participants use their own personal mobile devices to 
access a press release with high choice. I expect other mobile device features (i.e. handheld, 
ability to change screen orientation, etc.) increase processing costs even further, thus decreasing 
investors’ effort and information integration. I measure information integration by asking 
participants to estimate fundamental value. If participants integrate information about a transitory 
gain described on one tab with the financial statements on another tab, they should notice that 
earnings fell short of the prior year. Participants who do not fully integrate the information in the 
press release will estimate higher fundamental value. I measure participants’ effort by tracking 
the time they spend reading the disclosure and estimating fundamental value. Participants also 
answer questions that measure processing costs and other post-test and demographic questions. 
Results support my prediction that the influence of information choice on investors’ 
estimates of fundamental value depends on the screen size used to view the disclosure. 
Specifically, investors’ estimates of fundamental value reflect more information integration 
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when they have high choice relative to low choice on a traditional screen. In contrast, investors’ 
estimates of fundamental value reflect less information integration when they have high choice 
on a small screen relative to a traditional screen or low choice on a small screen. Consistent with 
theory, high choice on a traditional screen prompts investors to exert more effort. However, high 
choice together with a small screen make the disclosure more difficult to process, so investors 
exert less effort. Results are inferentially identical when I manipulate high choice on a small 
screen using an actual mobile device. I provide some evidence that actual mobile devices further 
increase investors’ processing costs, causing investors’ estimates of fundamental value to reflect 
less information integration. Further, results are robust to participants’ information acquisition, 
mobile device usage, and innate processing ability. Supplemental analyses suggest that the price 
investors are willing to pay per share follows a similar pattern as their estimates of fundamental 
value.  
 This study makes several contributions. First, I contribute to the literature investigating 
how narrative presentation attributes impact investors’ ease of processing and subsequent 
judgments (see Libby and Emett 2014 review). Specifically, I contribute to the medium 
presentation attribute line of research in two ways. Compared to traditional text-only mediums, 
new disclosure mediums provide a rich sensory experience that attract attention and are 
engaging. For example, examples of new disclosure mediums examined in prior research include 
XBRL (Hodge, Kennedy, and Maines 2004), infographics (Elliott, Grant, and Rennekamp 2016), 
video (Elliott, Hodge, and Sedor 2012), and social media (Elliott, Grant, and Hobson 2016; 
Elliott, Grant, and Hodge 2016). Consistent with proponents’ claims, I find that online 
disclosures providing information choice on a traditional screen encourage more effortful 
processing than static online disclosures, ultimately improving investors’ information 
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integration. I also introduce screen size to the accounting literature, which influences processing 
costs and investment judgments. I find that a small screen combined with a new medium 
disclosure decreases investors’ information integration. My results suggest screen size could be 
an important moderator of other medium effects documented in prior research. These findings 
are particularly important as investors are expected to increasingly use mobile devices to access, 
read, and trade on financial information (Fidelity 2014; PR Newswire 2014). 
Second, I contribute to the literature on how technology impacts investors’ receipt and 
processing of disclosures (Miller and Skinner 2015). Computers and the internet allow investors 
to access disclosures electronically (Ashbaugh, Johnstone, and Warfield 1999; Ettredge, 
Richardson, and Scholz 2002; Hodge 2001), via Google searches (Drake, Roulstone, and 
Thornock 2012) and in open webcast conference calls (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003). I 
contribute by isolating the impact of information choice, which differs in several ways from 
previous experimental work examining online disclosures. Specifically, Hodge (2001) finds that 
hyperlinking two disclosures causes investors to blend the information when evaluating the firm. 
In my study investors choose to view tabs of information in one disclosure. Hodge et al. (2004) 
and Hodge, Hopkins, and Wood (2010) find that presentation of related information in close 
proximity (i.e. on the same screen) improves investors’ information integration. In my study I 
hold information proximity constant at a “low” level by presenting related information on 
different tabs. I also contribute to recent archival literature examining the consequences of 
mobile technology for trading (e.g. Brown et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015). I provide evidence of 
a potential cost of mobile devices in addition to mobile devices being distracting (e.g. Brown et 
al. 2014). Specifically, I find that small screens increase processing costs because information is 
not in a fixed spatial location.  
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Finally, my study has practical implications for regulators, investors, and managers. The 
SEC suggests providing information choice as one way to reduce investors’ processing costs. My 
results that information choice combined with a small screen increase rather than decrease 
investors’ processing costs should inform the SEC as it continues disclosure reform initiatives. 
Second, investors increasingly report performing complex financial statement analysis tasks on 
their phones (Fidelity 2014). My evidence that information choice together with smaller screens 
results in lower information integration should caution investors about performing complex tasks 
on their phones, especially as disclosures increasingly feature information choice. Finally, my 
study also has practical implications for managers. Firms continue providing disclosures with 
information choice for computer and mobile access. My results suggest high choice disclosures 
improve investors’ information integration when viewed on traditional screens, but that firms 
should consider alternative presentation forms for mobile access.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
For many years, the SEC has promoted “the vital role of the Internet and electronic 
communications in modernizing the disclosure system under the federal securities laws and in 
promoting transparency, liquidity and efficiency in our trading markets” (SEC 2008). This 
commitment to modernizing disclosures is evident in many SEC decisions. For example, in 2008 
the SEC approved company websites as an acceptable disclosure channel under Regulation Fair 
Disclosure. The SEC further encouraged companies to present their website disclosures in an 
innovative, creative, and interactive way, rather than in a format comparable to paper-based 
information (SEC 2008).2 Traditionally, firms provided online press releases (i.e. quarterly and 
annual announcements of financial results) and annual reports as PDFs or web-based documents 
with all information in continuous pages or screens. However, firms are increasingly providing 
investors information choice within disclosures as firms split information provided in online 
disclosures into clickable tabs. 
Traditionally, investors report accessing and using financial information via computers to 
make investment decisions. However, investors are increasingly using mobile devices to access, 
read, and trade on information about firms (MarketWatch 2014).3 Investors can access financial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The SEC’s interest in modernizing disclosures extends to mandated disclosures as well. For example, in 2009 the 
SEC began requiring public companies to file their annual financial statements with the SEC using interactive 
tagged data called eXtensible Business Reporting Language (“XBRL”) (SEC 2008). The requirements were phased 
in over a couple of years, and finally in 2014 the SEC started enforcing XBRL filing requirements by sending letters 
to public companies failing to meet all requirements (Cohn 2014). In addition, the SEC intends to eventually replace 
the static EDGAR system with a fully interactive filing system called the interactive data electronic applications 
(IDEA) system. The SEC is also increasingly interested in providing interactivity within 10-K or S-1 disclosures. 
The SEC has even mentioned starting a Commission-authorized pilot program to evaluate disclosure interactivity. In 
the program, volunteer companies would produce websites of disclosure information drawn from existing SEC 
filings and feedback would be solicited from investors (SEC 2015).  
3 Generally, the use of mobile devices has expanded significantly in the United States. As of December 2014, there 
are approximately 355 million wireless subscriptions in the U.S., up from 159 million in December 2003. The 
number of wireless subscriptions in the U.S. now exceeds the number of people in the U.S. (CTIA 2013). Americans 
are increasingly using their mobile devices for internet access. In 2014, for the first time Americans used mobile 
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disclosures by using a mobile internet browser to navigate to a third party intermediary, the SEC, 
or exchange, brokerage house, and firm investor relations websites. In 2014 mobile devices 
accounted for 25% of visits to investor relations websites (Roach 2014) and 25% of visits to PR 
Newswire press releases. In 2015, these types of mobile visits are expected to increase to 50% 
and 31%, respectively (PR Newswire 2014; Roach 2014). Investors can also download 
applications, or “apps”, which are self-contained programs for mobile devices. Many third party 
news intermediaries offer apps, including news outlets like Bloomberg, TheStreet, MarketWatch 
by WSJ, and CNBC. The NASDAQ exchange offers an app featuring real-time last sale data, 
stock quotes, and other financial news. Finally, investor relations apps typically provide 
information about stock-related data and company communications such as presentations, 
videos, audiocast conference calls, and fact sheets, just like investor relations websites. A search 
on the iOS App Store reveals over 250 companies have investor relations apps, including firms 
like Citi Bank, Shell, and Walmart.4  
Investors also report performing complex investing-related tasks on their mobile devices. 
For example, more than 1.8 million proxy ballots were cast from a mobile device in 2014, a 
500% increase from 2011 (Murphy 2015). Further, a recent survey of Fidelity investors reported 
performing sophisticated investing tasks on mobile apps, including technical research/charting 
(43%), fundamental research/reading analyst reports (44%), and trading (41%) at least once a 
month. Investors can complete trades from most of the major brokerages’ mobile apps and major 
brokerage houses estimate that 15% to 20% of all retail trades are now coming from mobile 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
devices more than desktops to access the internet (comScore 2014). In fact, 45 million Americans use mobile phones 
as their primary internet access device (CTIA 2013). This time is spent on an increasing variety of activities, 
including web browsing, email, social media, online banking, shopping, and investing activities. !
4 Companies have a few options to obtain an IR App. First, companies like theIRapp offer turn-key investor relations 
apps for publicly traded companies. Second, companies already using the Nasdaq’s IR website hosting service are 
now provided with the option of a mobile app. Third, companies can develop proprietary apps. 
 10!
devices, up from 2% to 7% two years ago (Carey 2014; Patel 2014). More than half of investors 
(53%) indicated they placed their first mobile trade in the past 12 months, suggesting that mobile 
trading may become increasingly popular (Fidelity 2014).  
2.1 The Influence of Earnings Presentation Attributes on Investors’ Decisions 
I rely on prior information processing research to develop predictions about how 
informationally-equivalent disclosures can have different effects on investor judgments and 
decisions depending on presentation attributes. Since investors have limited processing 
resources, they often make trade offs when processing information (Simon 1978). For example, 
rather than use effortful (i.e. analytical) processing to unwind differences in information 
presentation, they often use less effortful (i.e. heuristic) processing and consider the information 
as presented (Payne 1982; Payne et al. 1993). Therefore, small differences in information 
presentation have significant implications for investors’ decisions. Presentation attributes can 
affect both information acquisition and integration, which are two stages necessary to make an 
investment decision. Information acquisition occurs when investors identify and read specific 
pieces of information sufficiently well to recall that information. Information integration 
involves evaluating the characteristics of the information and assimilating the various pieces of 
information to arrive at an overall judgment or decision (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk 
2007; Hodge et al. 2004; Maines and McDaniel 2000).  
Prior research has found that several narrative presentation attributes impact investors’ 
judgments and decisions (Libby and Emett 2014). For example, the location of amounts within 
narratives (Elliott 2006), readability (Li 2008; Miller 2010; Rennekamp 2012; You and Zhang 
2009), timing (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Hirshleifer et al. 2009), and medium are all narrative 
disclosure presentation attributes that influence investor decisions. Presentation attributes can 
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affect both decision stages (i.e. acquisition and integration) by changing investors’ processing 
costs, or the cognitive difficulty of extracting information (Bloomfield 2002). Information with 
higher processing costs is less likely to be acquired and integrated than information with lower 
processing costs (Elliott, Hobson, and White 2015; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). As a result, 
investors are less likely to base their investment decisions on information with higher processing 
costs (Bloomfield 2002). Consistent with this, archival research finds that high processing costs 
affect investors’ capital allocation and market outcomes. For example, when processing costs are 
high, investors trade less (Miller 2010), allocate less capital, and have significantly lower returns 
(Lawrence 2013). Further, the impounding of information into price is delayed for firms with 
difficult to process disclosures (You and Zhang 2009, Cohen and Lou 2010).  
To summarize, prior research has found that narrative presentation attributes can 
influence investors’ judgments and decisions. At least part of this effect is because investors fail 
to acquire information presented in a format with high processing costs. Moreover, even if 
acquired, investors might also fail to integrate related information if the information is presented 
in a format with high processing costs.  
2.2 The Effect of Attributes of Information Displays on Decision Strategies 
As discussed above, decision makers adapt how they process information based on 
features of the task (Payne 1982; Payne et al. 1993), including attributes of information displays 
(Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993; Schkade and Kleinmuntz 1994). Specifically, decision makers 
trade off the benefits and costs of different decision strategies when they “decide how to 
decide”.5 Attributes of information displays facilitate some decision strategies and hinder others 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Every cognitive task can be described on a continuum from effortless to highly effortful, which produces a 
corresponding metacognitive experience ranging from fluent to disfluent (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). Decision 
makers likely also consider processing fluency when weighing the costs and benefits of a particular decision 
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by altering the benefits and costs of the strategy. Prior research highlights three important 
conceptual attributes of information displays: form, organization, and sequence. New 
information technologies introduce many new examples of each of these three conceptual 
attributes of information displays that could influence investors’ decision processes. Below I 
outline new examples of these attributes of information displays.  
Form refers to whether information appears in numerical, verbal, or pictorial form 
(Kleinmuntz and Schkade 1993). Recently, two new trends in online financial reporting are 
changing the form of information displays. First, firms are providing separate summarized 
numerical information on the investor relations portion of the website. These “financial 
highlights” or “financial factbooks” tabulate key facts and figures without long narratives that 
verbally describe performance. Second, firms are depicting quantitative performance information 
in a style that highlights pictures rather than words. For example, Target uses different sized 
images of water drops to represent a decrease in water use in addition to word depictions. This 
new example of the form attribute of information display is increasingly prevalent in a variety of 
disclosures, including press releases, annual reports, and CSR reports. Specifically, in 2013, 26 
percent of the Fortune 100 annual reports and 52 percent of the Fortune 100 CSR reports 
highlight infographic depictions of financial information (Elliott, Grant, and Rennekamp 2016). 
Prior research suggests that numerical form or pictorial form will encourage investors to use a 
more effortful decision strategy relative to a verbal form (Huber 1980; Stone and Schkade 1991). 
Organization refers to the structure of information. Prior research finds that the 
organization of information across different sheets of paper increases the costs of processing 
information across sheets of paper (Bettman and Kakkar 1977; Bettman and Zins 1979; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
strategy. For example, disfluent information sometimes triggers a more effortful strategy (Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley, and Eyre 2007).  
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Jarvenpaa 1989). Prior research in accounting extends this research on organization to financial 
information displayed on computer screens. For example, information in close proximity 
displayed on the same computer screen reduces the costs of integrating information than when 
separated on different computer screens (Hodge, Hopkins, and Wood 2010). Similarly, related 
information presented in close proximity and linked by XBRL tags reduces the costs of 
integrating that information than when the information is not linked by XBRL tags (Hodge, 
Kennedy, and Maines 2004). An emerging technology—small screen mobile devices—is 
introducing new organization issues that affect the costs of processing information. Specifically, 
even holding information proximity constant, smaller screens increase the costs of effortfully 
processing information because information is in a variable spatial layout.  
Sequence refers to the order in which individual items or groups of items appear. Some 
prior research suggests that initially searching information listed first is a less costly strategy 
(Schkade and Kleinmuntz 1994), consistent with salience effects documented in prior accounting 
literature. Specifically, information presented first is integrated more in investors’ judgments 
than information presented later (Elliott 2006). However, a new trend in online financial 
reporting is changing the sequence of information displays. Specifically, firms are increasingly 
providing investors information choice within disclosures. In other words, firms are leveraging 
technology to split information provided in online disclosures into clickable tabs rather than 
providing the information in continuous pages or screens. This new attribute could prompt 
investors to use a more effortful directed information search strategy to choose the sections and 
order of information to read according to their individual preferences. Information choice could 
increase the benefits of effortfully processing the disclosure, causing judgments to reflect more 
integration of information traditionally presented later within disclosures.  
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To summarize, new information technologies introduce many new attributes of 
information displays that could influence investors’ judgments. In this study, I examine 
information choice and screen size because both are salient and increasingly prevalent attributes 
of information displays that I expect will interact to influence investors’ decision strategies and 
ultimately investment judgments.         
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Information Choice Within a Disclosure 
Information choice within disclosures is an attribute that encourages investors to use 
more effort (Ariely 2000; Warnick et al. 2005). Investors must actively choose which tabs to 
click and in what order when reading disclosures with high information choice. Investors’ 
attention is more focused and they are more engaged when continually choosing which tabs to 
click compared to passively reading a disclosure with low information choice. I predict that 
actively choosing the tabs and order of tabs to view on a traditional screen encourage investors to 
exert more effort, so their estimates of fundamental value reflect more information integration. 
This prediction is consistent with prior research in psychology on information choice or 
information pursuit. This research finds that making choices causes decision makers’ judgments 
to reflect more integration of that information than when it is supplied without an explicit choice 
(Bastardi and Shafir 1998; Redelmeier, Shafir, and Aujla 2001). Accounting researchers have 
extended this work to financial statement analysis and auditing contexts. First, Nelson and Tayler 
(2007) found that when users performed the analysis necessary to transform the financial 
statements to appear as if disclosed information had been recognized, that information affected 
users’ judgments more than it would have if it had been recognized initially. Second, Smith et al. 
(2015) found that auditors who chose to obtain information integrated that information more in 
an inventory obsolescence scenario than auditors provided the information without explicitly 
choosing to obtain it.  
I extend prior work on information choice in three ways. First, prior experiments on 
information choice explicitly ask participants if they would like to view additional information. 
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In my setting, the clickable tabs simply provide participants the flexibility to choose the sections 
and order of information to read. This natural feature of clickable tabs allows me to examine the 
influence of choice without interrupting investors’ natural processing. Second, prior research 
provides participants the choice of viewing a single information item. In my setting, participants 
choose among multiple tabs of information, which is more consistent with the complexity of 
choices investors face in the natural investment setting. Finally, I examine screen size as a 
moderator, which is becoming increasingly important as more investors use mobile devices to 
access and read clickable disclosures.  
3.2 The Interaction of Information Choice and Screen Size 
Investors increasingly report using smaller screen devices to access, read, and trade on 
financial information. A significant difference between mobile devices and computers (i.e. 
desktops and laptops) is the smaller physical screen size.6 Specifically, computers have an 
average screen size of 11 to 27 inches while mobile phones have an average screen size of just 3 
to 6 inches.7 A smaller screen displays less of a document at one time, so incremental scrolling is 
necessary to read the document relative to reading the document on a larger screen. Scrolling 
means that, since information “overflows” off the screen out of immediate view, users must 
access this off-screen information via a toolbar, mouse, finger, or other pointing device. An 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Mobile devices differ from computers in several other conceptual ways. For example, mobile devices are portable, 
handheld, and provide the ability to change screen orientation by rotating the device. Mobile devices also typically 
do not have a keyboard. Instead, the entire screen is touch-sensitive, requiring a finger or stylus pen to act as a 
mouse. I hold constant these other conceptual differences and focus on screen size. However, I perform a robustness 
check in section 4.2 where participants use actual mobile devices to complete the experiment. 
7 While the average size of new smartphones has increased from 2.6 inches in 2007 to 4.9 inches in 2014, new smart 
devices are again shrinking the size of screens. For example, smartwatches like Apple Watch, Pebble, and Sony 
Smartwatch provide the same capabilities of other mobile devices at an even smaller screen size of 1 to 2 inches. 
Analysts expect 25 to 40 million smartwatches will ship in 2015 (Hamblen 2015).  
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important consequence of this incremental scrolling is that information is no longer in a fixed 
spatial layout on the screen.8    
I expect a variable spatial layout (i.e. small screen) to increase investors’ processing costs 
in two ways. First, readers typically acquire both information and its spatial location on a page 
and within a document (Rothkopf 1971; Lovelace and Southall 1983). This spatial memory 
enables a reader to easily find information again and also improves subsequent recall (Lovelace 
and Southall 1983). Small screens change the location of information because information is not 
in a fixed spatial layout. The information could appear at the top or bottom of the screen 
depending on how much scrolling the reader has completed. As a result, readers cannot use the 
spatial location on the page as a visual cue to relocate or recall information. Instead, readers must 
create a memory for information based on its location relative to other information, which 
increases processing costs to relocate and recall that information (Piolat et al. 1997). Second, 
small screens also increase processing costs because the scrolling movement on the screen in 
peripheral vision unintentionally attracts attention. The act of scrolling moves read text off the 
screen so unread text can appear on the screen. Since movement in peripheral vision 
involuntarily captures attention (Remington et al. 1992, Wieczorek et al. 2014), even if a reader 
is carefully reading while scrolling, the peripheral scrolling movement attracts attention and 
increases processing costs.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 For expositional simplicity I refer to a traditional screen as a fixed spatial layout and a small screen as a variable 
spatial layout. In the natural setting, spatial layout can be thought of as a continuum with completely fixed at one 
end (i.e. disclosures with distinct pages viewed either in hard copy or on screen) and completely variable at the other 
end. Research in information technology finds a negative relationship between the degree of variable spatial layout 
and processing costs (Piolat et al. 1997; Sanchez and Branaghan 2011; Sanchez and Goolsbee 2010; Sanchez and 
Wiley 2009). However prior research finds mixed results of variable spatial layouts on participants’ ultimate 
judgments. I contribute to this literature by examining the interaction of spatial layout and information choice, 
which provides a potential explanation for prior disparate findings.  
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Prior research finds that decision makers adapt their information processing strategies 
depending on features of the task (Payne 1982; Payne et al. 1993). If the costs of processing 
information outweigh the benefits, investors are more likely to use less effort (Payne 1982). 
Making choices and navigating small screens both draw on the same pool of limited processing 
resources necessary to use effortful processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003; Vohs et al. 2008). In 
other words, high information choice together with small screens increase the costs of exerting 
effort. Therefore, I expect investors will exert less effort when they have high choice in an 
environment with already high processing costs (i.e. small screens), ultimately causing decisions 
to reflect less integration of information.  
 To summarize, I expect information choice within a disclosure viewed on a traditional 
screen to increase investors’ effort, causing estimates of fundamental value to reflect more 
information integration. However, I expect that information choice when processing costs are 
high (i.e. a small screen) to decrease investors’ effort, causing estimates of fundamental value to 
reflect less information integration.9 These differing effects of information choice should result 
in an interaction between information choice and screen size, which is formally hypothesized as 
follows: 
H1: When estimating fundamental value, high information choice will positively 
(negatively) affect investors’ information integration when they view the disclosure on a 
traditional (small) screen.10 11 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Neoclassical economics without the assumption of bounded rationality would predict invariant estimates of 
fundamental value across conditions. Therefore, observing differences in estimates across conditions indicates bias.  
10 My predictions for the dependent variable are at the construct level (i.e. integration). In my setting, if participants 
integrate information about a transitory gain, estimates of fundamental value will be lower. Therefore, the prediction 
at an operational level is: investors’ estimates of fundamental value will be lower (higher) when they have high 
choice on a traditional screen (small screen) than when they have high choice. 
11 I do not make a directional prediction about information integration when investors view a disclosure with low 
choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen. Investors could perceive that a small screen significantly 
increases processing costs, so they decrease their effort and ultimately integrate less information. However, this 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
To test my predictions, I conduct an experiment with a 2 x 2 + 1 between-subjects design, 
with information choice and screen size as manipulated independent factors. I manipulate 
information choice by providing participants high (clickable tabs) or low (no clickable tabs) 
choice over the sections and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate 
screen size by presenting the press release on a traditional computer size screen or a small mobile 
device size screen. I include an additional small screen condition where participants use their 
own personal mobile devices to access a press release with high choice.  
4.1 Judgment and Decision-Making versus Experimental Economics Style Design  
I choose a behavioral judgment and decision-making (“JDM”) style experiment rather 
than an experimental economics style experiment for several reasons. First, I choose a 
contextually rich JDM setting because I am interested in how presentation attributes influence 
investors’ information processing. An experimental economics approach necessitates a great deal 
of abstraction in experimental materials. Participants need to know exactly what is and is not 
relevant to determine value when making buying and selling decisions. This level of abstraction 
could create difficulties observing an information processing effect when one exists simply 
because the judgment task is more transparent than in the natural setting (Kachelmeier and King 
2002).  
Second, my specific research question minimizes two common concerns about JDM 
studies. The two common criticisms of JDM settings are the lack of performance-based 
incentives and lack of market forces, which would potentially drive the suboptimal behavior !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
difficulty could serve as a cue that the task is difficult and trigger more effort, ultimately causing investors to 
integrate more information (Alter et al. 2007).  
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away. In my study, students participate in the experiment in exchange for course extra credit. I 
did not offer performance-based monetary incentives for practical and theoretical reasons. First, 
in my setting no normative fundamental value benchmark exists to compute participants’ 
performance-based payment. Normatively, participants should adjust net income for the 
transitory gain when estimating fundamental value, but could also consider the influence of the 
transitory gain on the other inputs to the residual income model. Second, providing performance-
based incentives likely does not interact with my manipulated independent variables in a way 
that changes the inferences drawn. Performance-based incentives could improve participants’ 
performance across all conditions, or even exacerbate the differences I observe across conditions 
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Further, few experiments have shown that market forces eliminate 
information processing biases. Even when market forces mitigate a bias, they typically affect the 
magnitude rather than the sign of the bias. Since directional effects, not magnitudes, are 
generalized from experiments, a market does not usually alter an experiment’s inferences (Libby, 
Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002).  
4.2 Participants 
Participants are 134 graduate business students from a large, public university.12 
Participants have taken on average 11.2 accounting courses and 4.3 finance courses. All 
participants have used financial statements to evaluate a firm’s performance at least once. 
Overall, 22.4 percent of participants have purchased common stock or debt securities, while 79.1 
percent plan to do so in the next five years. I choose student subjects for several reasons. First, I 
match participants’ knowledge to the task without using more sophisticated subjects than 
necessary (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). In the task, participants have to integrate a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the affiliated university approved the use of human subjects for the 
experiment reported in this paper. 
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transitory gain described in the narrative with the financial statements. I choose graduate 
business students because they are familiar with different persistence of earnings components 
and have experience integrating information in this type of task. Second, students have 
reasonable familiarity with mobile devices (discussed in more detail in section 6.1). Finally, I 
conduct experimental sessions in a lab to maintain control over the screen size manipulation. 
Using a lab I can ensure all participants use the same size computer so the manipulation appears 
identical for every participant. Participants complete the study via an online instrument within 
the lab. 
4.3 Task and Procedures  
Participants arrive at a computer lab session, sit at a computer, and are randomly assigned 
to a condition by the online instrument. I instruct participants to assume the role of an investor 
evaluating a potential investment. The firm they are considering is FreshHouse, a fictitious firm 
in the fast-casual restaurant industry.13 After reading instructions, participants view background 
information about the firm and its industry and a press release containing summary financial 
statement information. FreshHouse’s press release narrative and financial statements indicate 
that reported revenues and net income increased over the prior year. While not explicitly 
discussed, all income statement line items changed approximately +/- 1% except general and 
administrative expenses and net income. G&A expenses decreased 6% from the prior year and 
net income increased 8% from the prior year. The narrative portion of the press release indicates 
that the “decrease in G&A expenses in 2014 was due to a one-time benefit of approximately $8 
million related to the favorable resolution of an insurance settlement”. The firm does not disclose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!The materials were constructed from press releases, Forms 8-K and 10-K, and Internet websites for companies 
operating in the fast-casual restaurant industry.  
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a non-GAAP earnings per share amount. If participants integrate the transitory gain with the 
financial statements, FreshHouse’s net income actually falls short of prior period net income.  
I choose a setting of a transitory gain without the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
amount per share for several reasons. First, including the transitory gain in the narrative requires 
participants to integrate this information with the financial statements to determine that the 
firm’s persistent earnings decreased from the prior period. This allows me to test if high 
processing costs decrease investors’ ability to integrate information from the narrative and the 
financial statements. Second, a transitory gain rather than loss is consistent with managers’ 
reporting incentives. Reporting a non-GAAP earnings per share amount that excludes the 
transitory gain results in lower non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings. Therefore, suppressing 
non-GAAP earnings per share could cause higher inferences about persistent earnings. Finally, 
an insurance settlement gain is a common transitory gain described in the narrative (e.g. 
Baumker, Biggs, McVay, and Pierce 2014). Further, some managers do not report non-GAAP 
earnings and only describe a transitory gain in the narrative (e.g. Curtis, McVay, and Whipple 
2014). After reviewing this information, participants respond to dependent variable measures, 
manipulation check questions, and other post-test questions.  
4.4 Information Choice Manipulation 
I manipulate information choice by providing FreshHouse’s press release in either a high 
choice or low choice format. In both conditions, the top of the screen lists tabs labeled as 
“Company Overview”, “Industry Conditions,” “Financial Highlights,” “Performance Changes,” 
“Income Statement,” “Balance Sheet,” and “Financial Ratios.” Also in both conditions, only one 
section of information appears on the screen at a time. In high choice conditions, participants 
click on the tabs to display that section of the press release. Participants can click on the tabs in 
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any order they want and as many times as they want. In low choice conditions, participants 
cannot click on these tabs to move throughout the press release. Instead, they must click “next” 
and “back” buttons to move sequentially through the press release. I hold constant the amount of 
information shown at one time and hold constant the categorical nature of the tabs across 
conditions to isolate the effect of information choice. Images of my manipulations are included 
in Appendix C.  
4.5 Screen Size (i.e. Spatial Layout) Manipulation 
I manipulate screen size by varying whether information is in a large box (i.e. fixed 
spatial layout) or in a small box (i.e. variable spatial layout) on the computer screen. The large 
screen box is 11.25 inches wide x 6.5 inches high, which is the size of a 13-in MacBook Pro. 
Information on each tab fits in the box with no scrolling necessary. The small screen box is 5.44 
inches wide x 2.64 inches high, which is the size of an iPhone 6 in landscape mode. I display the 
small screen box in landscape format so the financial statements fit in the width of the screen 
without scrolling left or right, which are current mobile-friendly guidelines (Winkler 2015). A 
scroll bar appears on the right side of the small screen manipulation so participants know 
scrolling is necessary to view all information in the tab. The large and small screen size 
manipulations only occur for the press release. The remainder of the experiment—introductory 
material, dependent variables, and other post-test questions—is completed on a full computer 
screen without a box on the screen. Images of my manipulations are included in Appendix C.  
I present both screen size manipulations on a computer to hold constant all other 
differences between traditional and small screen devices (e.g. sitting on table versus handheld, 
mouse versus touchscreen, fixed screen orientation versus ability to change screen orientation, 
etc.). However, I run an additional high choice/small screen condition using participants’ actual 
 24!
mobile devices. I expect that actual mobile device features (i.e. scrolling, handheld, ability to 
change screen orientation, etc.) increase processing costs even further, thus decreasing investors’ 
effort and information integration. This condition is important to examine because actual mobile 
devices are a more externally valid manipulation than a small screen manipulated on a computer. 
In this condition, participants begin the experiment on a computer, but view the firm’s press 
release on their personal mobile device. Consistent with the primary experiment, the screen size 
manipulation (i.e. using a mobile device) only occurs for the press release. The remainder of the 
experiment—introductory material, dependent variables, and other post-test questions—is 
completed on a full computer screen. 
4.6 Dependent and Process Variables 
4.6.1 Information Integration—Estimates of Fundamental Value and Adjustments to Net 
Income 
My hypothesis focuses on investors’ information integration. My primary proxy for 
information integration is participants’ estimates of fundamental value. After reviewing the press 
release, participants estimate the fundamental value of the firm’s stock. To derive an estimate of 
fundamental value, participants provide estimates necessary to complete a residual earnings 
valuation template in a spreadsheet (adapted from Elliott et al. 2014, 2015a). Participants provide 
their best estimate of the current year’s net income (i.e., they could use earnings as reported or 
adjust it), forecasts of earnings for each of the four subsequent years, a cost of capital estimate, 
and an estimated residual earnings growth rate after the fourth year (Penman 2012). The template 
then calculates and displays the resulting estimate of fundamental value, which participants 
record in the online survey. Appendix D reproduces one participant’s completed template. I 
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provide additional support for H1 by using an additional proxy for information integration: the 
number of participants who adjust net income when estimating fundamental value.  
Prior research has proxied for information integration with numerous investment 
judgment measures. Some measures capture relatively more heuristic judgments, which are 
investors’ affective responses or “gut feelings.” For example, prior research has asked investors 
to allocate investment dollars between two or more firms (Elliott et al. 2007; Hodge et al. 2004), 
judge current and future earnings potential (Elliott 2006), and assess the attractiveness and 
likelihood of investing in a firm’s stock, or “willingness to invest” (Elliott, Hobson, and Jackson 
2011). Other measures capture relatively more analytical judgments, requiring more calculated, 
effortful processing. For example, prior research has asked investors to estimate a P/E multiple 
(Clor-Proell, Proell, and Warfield 2014), estimate future cash flows (Hodge, Hopkins, and Wood 
2010), or to provide estimates necessary to complete a residual earnings valuation.   
In this study I chose residual earnings valuation, an analytical judgment, as a proxy for 
information integration for several reasons. First, this proxy minimizes measurement error. 
Heuristic measures introduce the possibility of noise in the dependent measure from participants’ 
idiosyncratic interpretations of the response scale. As a result of measurement error, I could fail 
to find a significant effect of my manipulated independent variables on the dependent variable 
when one actually exists. My measure minimizes this possibility because participants do not 
need to interpret a response scale. Instead, they either demonstrate information integration by 
adjusting net income or do not. Second, I maximize construct validity by choosing a proxy that 
closely maps to the construct. Heuristic measures like willingness to invest likely capture 
information integration, but could also capture other constructs, for example, assessments of firm 
risk. The residual earnings valuation template allows me to disentangle these constructs by 
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separately analyzing information integration based on participants’ adjustments to net income 
and risk assessments based on cost of capital estimates. Finally, I actually bias against finding 
support for my predictions by choosing an effort-inducing proxy, which makes my findings even 
more compelling.  
4.6.2 Effort Measure 
I measure participants’ effort as the total amount of time spent reading the disclosure and 
estimating fundamental value (Bettman et al. 1990; Sprinkle 2000). The online platform for my 
experimental materials tracks participants’ time spent.  
4.6.3 Processing Cost Measures and Post-Experimental Questions 
I ask three questions to measure participants’ processing costs: 1) “How hard did you 
have to work in your attempt to understand the contents of the press release?”, 2) “How irritated 
and/or annoyed did you feel?”, and 3) “How much mental and physical activity was required, 
e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching etc.?” Participants respond 
to all processing cost questions on a 101-point scale with endpoints 0 (“Very Low”) and 100 
(“Very High”) (modified from Hart and Staveland 1988). 
Finally, participants answer two manipulation-check questions, and respond to questions 
regarding their use of mobile devices, demographics, potential alternative explanations, controls, 
and innate processing ability.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
5.1 Manipulation Checks 
To assess the effectiveness of the information choice manipulation, I ask participants, 
“How did you view FreshHouse’s press release?” with answer choices “I could only click next 
and back buttons and did not have choices over the order I viewed information” or “I could click 
on orange tabs and had choices over the order I viewed information.” Eighty-seven percent of 
participants in the primary conditions and 95 percent of participants in the actual mobile device 
condition correctly answer this question. To assess the effectiveness of the screen size 
manipulation, I ask participants, “How was the FreshHouse press release formatted?” with 
answer choices “There was a large box on the screen. I could see all the information in the box at 
one time without scrolling up and down” or “There was a small box on the screen. I had to scroll 
up and down to see all the information in the box.” Ninety-five percent of participants in the 
primary conditions and 95 percent of participants in the actual mobile device condition correctly 
answer this question. There are no significant differences in correct response rates across 
conditions for either question (all p-values > 0.77, two-tailed). Thus, it appears my manipulations 
were successful.14 
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 1—Information Integration 
5.2.1 Estimates of Fundamental Value per Share  
H1 predicts that information choice will positively (negatively) affect investors’ 
information integration when they view the disclosure on a traditional (small) screen. If investors 
integrate information from FreshHouse’s narrative and financial statements, they discover that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Results are inferentially identical if I exclude participants who fail either manipulation check. !
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persistent earnings actually fell short of the prior period. Therefore, lower estimates of 
fundamental value reflect more information integration. Table 1 Panel A reports cell sizes, 
means, and standard deviations for estimates of fundamental value for the four primary 
conditions and supplemental actual mobile device condition. Figure 1 displays the pattern of cell 
means for estimates of fundamental value.  
Table 1 Panel B presents a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for the four 
primary conditions with estimates of fundamental value as the dependent variable. Results reveal 
a significant information choice by screen size interaction (p < 0.01).15 16 Table 1 Panel C 
presents the follow-up simple effects tests for the four primary conditions. Lower estimates of 
fundamental value reflect more information integration. Results show that investors’ estimates of 
fundamental value reflect significantly more information integration when they have high choice 
compared to low choice on a traditional screen ($63.84 < $73.03; p = 0.01, one-tailed). However, 
investors’ estimates of fundamental value reflect less information integration when they have 
high choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen ($70.89 > $63.84; p = 0.04, one-
tailed) or low choice on a small screen ($70.89 > $65.34; p = 0.07, one-tailed). Taken together, 
these results are consistent with H1. 
Ex ante I did not make a directional prediction about investors’ estimates of fundamental 
value when they have low choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen. Results 
show that investors’ estimates of fundamental value reflect significantly more information !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Shapiro-Wilk’s test of normality rejects the null that participants’ estimates of fundamental value are normally 
distributed in one of the four conditions (p < 0.01). Specifically, participants’ estimates of fundamental value in the 
low choice/large screen condition are strongly positively skewed. Therefore, I apply a logarithmic transformation to 
estimates of fundamental value in all four conditions. I report results of the untransformed values for H1 for ease of 
interpretation, but all results are inferentially identical if I use the transformed values.  
16 Results for all hypotheses are robust to including as control variables participants’ assessments of management’s 
credibility (i.e. competence and trustworthiness), forthcomingness, and disclosure readability. My results are also 
insensitive to including as controls participants’ gender, first language, number of times they have evaluated 
financial statements, investing experience, and individual risk preferences.  
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integration when they have low choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen 
($65.34 < $73.03; p = 0.04, two-tailed).!This simple effect is consistent with prior research 
finding that when information is presented in a way that is difficult to process, this difficulty 
serves as a cue that the task itself is difficult and prompts more effort (Alter et al. 2007).  
I run an additional condition where investors use an actual mobile device to view a 
disclosure with high information choice. Table 1 Panel D presents planned comparisons 
confirming that as expected, results are inferentially identical when I manipulate high 
choice/small screen on an actual mobile device. Specifically, I find that investors’ estimates of 
fundamental value reflect significantly less information integration when they have high choice 
an actual mobile device compared to a traditional screen (p < 0.01) or low choice on a small 
screen manipulated on a computer (p < 0.01). Further, investors’ estimates of fundamental value 
reflect marginally less information integration when I manipulate high choice/small screen on an 
actual mobile device compared to a computer (p = 0.07, one-tailed). This is consistent with my 
expectation that scrolling, resizing text, rotating the phone, etc. required on an actual mobile 
device increase participants’ processing costs and thus decrease investors’ effort and information 
integration. I provide process evidence consistent with this increased processing costs 
explanation in section 5.3.2.  
5.2.2 Additional Support for H1: Adjustments to Net Income 
For robustness, I also examine the number of investors who adjust net income as 
additional support for H1. In applying the residual income model, investors can input net income 
as reported by the firm or adjust it for nonrecurring items. If investors integrate information 
about the transitory gain described in the narrative with the firm’s financial statements, they will 
adjust current period net income down. Table 2 Panel A reports the percentage and proportion of 
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investors by condition who adjust current period net income for the transitory gain for the four 
primary conditions and supplemental actual mobile device condition.  
Table 2 Panel B reports planned comparisons for the four primary conditions. Results 
show that significantly more investors adjust net income when they have high choice compared 
to low choice on a traditional screen (p = 0.03, one-tailed). Further, fewer investors adjust net 
income when they have high choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen (p = 0.05, 
one-tailed).  
Table 2 Panel C presents planned comparisons confirming that as expected, results are 
inferentially identical when I manipulate high choice/small screen on an actual mobile device. 
Specifically, I find that fewer investors adjust net income when they have high choice on an 
actual mobile device compared to high choice on a traditional screen (p = 0.02, one-tailed) or 
low choice on a small screen manipulated on a computer (p = 0.10, one-tailed). Taken together, 
these results provide additional support for H1 that information choice will positively 
(negatively) affect investors’ information integration when they view the disclosure on a 
traditional (small) screen. Further, this suggests my theory and results generalize to actual mobile 
devices, which is a more externally valid manipulation.  
5.3 Measures of the Underlying Process   
In this section I examine if, as expected, investors integrate more information when they 
exert more effort (section 5.3.1). I also examine if investors exert less effort when they view a 
disclosure with high choice on a small screen because processing costs are high (section 5.3.2).  
5.3.1 Effort 
I expect that investors integrate more information when they exert more effort. I measure 
effort using the time investors spend reading the disclosure and estimating fundamental value. 
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Therefore, I expect that high choice will positively (negatively) affect investors’ effort when they 
view the disclosure on a traditional (small) screen. Table 3 Panel A reports cell sizes, means, and 
standard deviations for time spent in seconds for the four primary conditions and the 
supplemental actual mobile device condition.  
Table 3 Panel B presents a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for the four 
primary conditions with time spent as the dependent variable. Results reveal a significant 
information choice by screen size interaction (p < 0.01). Table 3 Panel C presents the follow-up 
simple effects tests for the four primary conditions. Results show that investors spend 
significantly more time when they have high choice compared to low choice on a traditional 
screen (p < 0.01, one-tailed). Conversely, investors spend marginally less time when they have 
high choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen (p = 0.06, one-tailed). Finally, 
while not significant at conventional levels, investors spend less time when they have high 
choice compared to low choice on a small screen (p = 0.13, one-tailed). This final simple effect 
is not significant when small screen is manipulated on a computer, but is significant when small 
screen is manipulated on an actual mobile device, as reported below.  
I expect actual mobile device features (i.e. handheld, ability to change screen orientation, 
etc.) increase processing costs even further than a small screen manipulated on a computer, thus 
decreasing investors’ effort. As reported in Table 3 Panel D, these effort comparisons are 
statistically significant, as expected, when small screen is manipulated on an actual mobile 
device. Results reveal that investors spend significantly less time when they have high choice on 
an actual mobile device compared to on a traditional screen (p = 0.01, one-tailed) or low choice 
on a small screen manipulated on a computer (p = 0.03, one-tailed).17 Taken together, this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The data for the time measure is not normally distributed, so I also run nonparametric tests. Results are 
inferentially identical using nonparametric or parametric tests.  
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provides evidence that high information choice positively (negatively) affect investors’ effort 
when they view the disclosure on a traditional (small) screen. 
5.3.2 Processing Costs 
In the previous section, I provide evidence that investors exert significantly less effort 
when they have high choice on a small screen compared to a traditional screen, especially when 
small screen is manipulated on an actual mobile device. I expect that investors exert less effort 
because making choices while clicking tabs together with a small screen increases processing 
costs. I also expect high choice together with actual mobile device features (i.e. scrolling, 
handheld, ability to change screen orientation, etc.) increases processing costs even further. I 
measure investors’ processing costs by asking three questions: 1) “How hard did you have to 
work in your attempt to understand the contents of the press release?” 2) “How irritated and/or 
annoyed did you feel?” and 3) “How much mental and physical activity was required, e.g., 
thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, searching etc.?” Investors respond to all 
questions on a 101-point scale with endpoints 0 (“Very low”) and 100 (“Very high”). 
Inconsistent with my expectation, processing costs are not statistically different across any of the 
primary conditions (all p-values > 0.18). For example, participants with high choice on a small 
screen report statistically similar processing costs as participants with high choice on a 
traditional screen (46.60 = 52.24, t (50) = 1.35, p = 0.18, two-tailed). However, as expected I do 
find that participants with high choice on an actual mobile device report higher processing costs 
than participants with high choice on a traditional screen (mean of 64.95 > 52.24, t (43) = 2.91, p 
< 0.001, untabulated).  
The insignificant differences across my primary conditions are likely due to the order I 
ask questions in the experiment. In the experiment, participants see the press release containing 
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the information choice and screen size manipulations, estimate fundamental value, and then 
answer processing costs questions. I ask the questions in this order to avoid interrupting 
investors’ natural processing. However, processing costs from the press release and effort 
exerted to estimate fundamental value both draw on the same pool of cognitive processing 
resources (Neys 2006). Therefore, asking the processing costs questions after both the press 
release and fundamental value question likely introduced noise into the measures. I examine this 
possibility by providing additional out of sample evidence in section 5.3.3. 
5.3.3 Processing Costs Out of Sample Evidence 
To ensure that high choice together with small screens increase processing costs, I run 
modified high choice/traditional screen and high choice/small screen conditions. In these 
conditions, 43 participants from the same population complete the experiment, but answer 
processing cost questions immediately after viewing the press release and then proceed to 
estimate fundamental value and finish the rest of the experiment. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 
confirms that the three questions are capturing the same underlying construct, with higher 
(lower) values indicating higher (lower) processing costs. As expected, I find that investors with 
high choice on a small screen manipulated on a computer report higher processing costs than 
investors with high choice on a traditional screen (mean processing costs of 42.64 > 31.52, t (41) 
= 2.00, p = 0.03 one-tailed untabulated).18  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Consistent with the primary analyses reported in section 5.2.1, investors’ estimates of fundamental value reflect 
marginally less information integration when they have high choice on a small screen compared to a traditional 
screen (p = 0.08, one-tailed). 
 34!
CHAPTER 6 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.1 Examining Alternative Explanations 
In the post-experiment questionnaire, I collect several additional measures to rule out 
potential alternative explanations. I examine whether investors’ information acquisition, mobile 
device use, or innate information processing ability influence my results.  
6.1.1 Alternative Explanations and Controls—Information Acquisition 
 I ask six multiple choice information acquisition questions to assess investors’ acquisition 
of specific numerical information and narrative explanations from the press release. The 
questions ask about information appearing on the top, middle, and bottom of the various tabs. I 
ask relatively difficult questions to ensure that differences in information acquisition can be 
detected. On average investors answer 3.82 out of 6.00 questions correctly. The number of 
questions answered correctly does not differ across conditions (all p-values > 0.33). 
Nevertheless, I include investors’ information acquisition scores as a control in my hypothesis 
test. As expected, I find that the coefficient on information acquisition is significant (p = 0.01), 
but the coefficient on the interaction of information choice and screen size remains significant (p 
< 0.01). This suggests that, while information acquisition affects investors’ estimates of 
fundamental value, acquisition is not driving my results.   
 One of the information acquisition questions assesses if participants’ acquired that the 
insurance gain was transitory. I separately analyze only the 72 participants who acquire the 
transitory gain to provide further support that information integration rather than acquisition 
drives estimates of fundamental value. An untabulated ANOVA reveals a significant information 
choice by screen size interaction (F!,!"= 10.84, p < 0.01). All four follow-up simple effects are 
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significant (all p-values < 0.02 one-tailed). Taken together, these results are inferentially 
identical to the primary analyses and consistent with H1.  
6.1.2 Alternative Explanations and Controls—Mobile Device Use 
I randomly assign participants to an experimental condition to maintain control over 
extraneous variables that could affect my dependent variable, thus enabling me to make causal 
inferences. A potential concern is that if I had allowed participants to self-select to an 
experimental condition, I would not observe an effect of information choice and screen size on 
estimates of fundamental value. In other words, high mobile experience participants would self-
select to small screen conditions and integrate more information when estimating fundamental 
value compared to participants randomly assigned to small screen conditions. I collect two 
measures in the post-test about participants’ mobile device use to address this concern.  
Specifically, I ask participants about the activities for which they use their mobile device 
and the amount of time per day they use their device. I find that participants use their mobile 
devices for a variety of activities, including texting/emailing (99%), phone calls (96% of 
participants), social media (96%), banking (75%), shopping (53%), school work/work (51%), 
and reading (40%). I create a mobile activity intensity measure by summing the number of 
activities for which participants indicate using their mobile device with smaller (larger) values 
indicating lower (higher) mobile intensity. Further, I find that three percent of participants use 
their mobile device for 1 – 30 minutes per day, 14 percent use their mobile device for 31 – 60 
minutes per day, 45 percent use their mobile device for 61 – 120 minutes per day, 21 percent use 
their mobile device for 121 – 180 minutes per day, and 15 percent use their mobile device more 
than 181 minutes per day.  
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I perform three analyses to address concerns that high mobile experience participants are 
more likely to integrate information when estimating fundamental value. First, I examine 
correlations between participants’ mobile device use and estimates of fundamental value. I find 
that participants’ mobile activity intensity and mobile time are not significantly correlated with 
estimates of fundamental value (!! = 0.005, p = 0.95 two-tailed; !! = -0.006, p = 0.95 two-tailed, 
respectively). Further, I separately calculate correlation coefficients for participants assigned to 
small screen conditions. Again, I find that participants’ mobile activity intensity and mobile time 
are not significantly correlated with estimates of fundamental value (!! = 0.04, p = 0.74 two-
tailed; !! = 0.03, p = 0.85 two-tailed, respectively).  
Second, I include participants’ mobile activity intensity or mobile time as a covariate in 
my hypothesis test, and find that the coefficients are not significant (all p-values > 0.55) and the 
interaction of information choice and screen size remains significant (p = 0.01). Finally, I 
interact participants’ mobile activity intensity and mobile time with my independent variables. I 
find that the main and interactive effects of mobile activity intensity are insignificant (all p-
values > 0.23) and the interaction of information choice and screen size remains significant (p < 
0.01). I also find that the main and interactive effects of mobile time are insignificant (all p-
values > 0.16) and the interaction of information choice and screen size remains significant (p = 
0.01). Taken together, this provides evidence that high mobile experience participants, the 
participants most likely to self-select to view disclosures on small screens, are not more likely to 
integrate information when estimating fundamental value.  
6.1.3 Alternative Explanations and Controls—Innate Processing Ability 
 I measure innate processing ability at the very end of the experiment using the short 
computerized version of the Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN) task (Foster et al. 2014). 
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This task requires the simultaneous processing and storage of unrelated information. 
Specifically, participants are presented with a series of simple math equations and evaluate the 
equation by clicking a “correct” or “incorrect” button. Participants are then given a letter to 
remember for a later test. After completing the set, participants select the letters that were 
presented after the equations from a matrix of 12 possible choices. Participants’ score is the 
number of letters recalled in the correct serial position. I find that participants’ innate processing 
ability is not correlated with responses to processing costs questions (all r < 0.11 and p > 0.14). 
Further, I find that the innate processing ability score is not significant (all p-values > 0.66) when 
included as a control variable in my hypothesis test, leaving my inferences unchanged. 
6.2 Supplemental Analysis: Investors’ Willingness to Pay 
Thus far I have provided evidence that information choice and screen size interact to 
influence investors’ estimates of fundamental value. A potential concern is that investors in small 
screen conditions are less likely to act on their estimates of fundamental value than investors in 
traditional screen conditions. I address this concern in supplemental analysis by examining if 
investors’ estimates of fundamental value have implications for the price they are willing to pay 
for shares of the firm’s stock. Examining price effects also serves as a robustness check of my 
primary analyses. I expect investors’ willingness to pay displays a similar pattern as estimates of 
fundamental value and that investors using small screens are not less willing to act on their 
estimates of fundamental value than investors using traditional screens. Specifically, I expect 
investors with high choice on a traditional screen are willing to pay less than investors with low 
choice on a traditional screen. I also expect investors with high choice on a small screen are 
willing to pay more than investors with high choice on a traditional screen or low choice on a 
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small screen. In other words, I expect that investors’ willingness to pay is driven by their 
estimates of fundamental value.  
A post-test portion of my materials elicited investors’ willingness to pay. After investors 
estimate fundamental value, I measure willingness to pay by asking investors to “assume that 
you have received an inheritance of $100,000 in cash from a distant relative. Please indicate the 
maximum price per share at which you would be willing to invest the following amounts in 
FreshHouse’s stock.” I ask the maximum price they would pay to allocate “$50,000, or 50 
percent, of your inheritance,” “$25,000, or 25 percent, of your inheritance,” “$10,000 or 10 
percent of your inheritance,” and “$5,000 or 5 percent of your inheritance”. Table 4 Panel A 
reports cell sizes, means, and standard deviations for willingness to pay prices by condition.19 I 
measure each participant’s ‘‘price profile’’ rather than asking for a single price at which they 
would be willing to invest in order to better control for participant-specific determinants of 
willingness-to-pay. A repeated-measures design reduces participant-specific variation and 
increases the power of my tests (Stevens 1996; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li 2005). Figure 
2 graphically displays the pattern of cell means for willingness to pay prices.  
Table 4 Panel B presents a three-way mixed ANOVA. The mixed ANOVA includes 
information choice and screen size as between-subjects independent variables and investors’ four 
willingness to pay prices as the dependent variables. Results reveal a significant Percentage of 
Inheritance Invested within-subjects effect (F!,!"# = 156.58,!p < 0.001). As expected, the 
positive slope indicates that investors would pay more per share to invest smaller portions of 
their inheritance in the firm’s stock than larger portions. Also as expected, results reveal a 
significant information choice by screen size between-subjects interaction (F!,!"# = 5.92,!p = 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 In this supplemental analysis, I exclude two participants who did not respond to the willingness to pay measures. 
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0.02). I further analyze this significant interaction by separately running mixed ANOVAs for 
traditional screen and small screen conditions.  
Table 4 Panel C presents a mixed ANOVA for traditional screen conditions. The mixed 
ANOVA includes information choice as a between-subjects independent variable and investors’ 
four willingness to pay prices as the dependent variables. Results reveal a significant Percentage 
of Inheritance Invested within-subjects effect (F!,!" = 71.21,!p < 0.001). As expected, the 
positive slope indicates that investors would pay more per share to invest smaller portions of 
their inheritance in the firm’s stock than larger portions. Also as expected, results reveal a 
marginally significant information choice between-subjects effect (F!,!" = 3.26,!p = 0.08), and 
an insignificant within-subjects information choice by percentage of inheritance interaction 
(F!,!" = 0.82,!p = 0.37). This suggests that investors with high choice on a traditional screen are 
willing to pay less than investors with low choice on a traditional screen across all percentage 
levels of inheritance invested.  
Table 4 Panel D presents a mixed ANOVA for small screen conditions. The mixed 
ANOVA includes information choice as a between-subjects independent variable and investors’ 
four willingness to pay prices as the dependent variables. As with traditional screen conditions, 
the within-subjects effects indicate prices increase as percentage of inheritance increases 
(F!,!" = 86.80,!p < 0.001). Results also reveal a marginally significant information choice 
between-subjects effect (F!,!" = 2.97,!p = 0.09), and an insignificant within-subjects information 
choice by percentage of inheritance interaction (F!,!" = 2.36,!p = 0.13). This suggests investors 
with high choice on a small screen are willing to pay more than investors with low choice on a 
small screen across all percentage levels of inheritance invested.  
In untabulated results, I confirm that differences in willingness to pay are driven by 
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investors’ estimates of fundamental value. When investors’ estimates of fundamental value are 
included as a covariate in the mixed ANOVA for traditional screen conditions, the between-
subjects coefficient is significant (!!,!" = 57.76, p < 0.001), and the information choice main 
effect is no longer significant (!!,!" = 0.001, p = 0.98). Similarly, when investors’ estimates of 
fundamental value are included as a covariate in the mixed ANOVA for small screen conditions, 
the between-subjects coefficient is significant (!!,!! = 9.05, p < 0.001), and the information 
choice main effect is not significant (!!,!! = 1.60, p = 0.21). Taken together, these results suggest 
that investors in small screen conditions are not less likely to act on their estimates of 
fundamental value than investors in traditional screen conditions. Further, these results are 
consistent with theory and are a robustness check for my primary analyses.  
6.3 Supplemental Analysis: Investors’ Information Search Strategies 
 In this section, I examine the information search strategies investors use as they analyze 
the firm’s press release. Specifically, I examine whether investors use a sequential or directed 
search strategy (section 6.3.1), the number of direction changes investors make while reading the 
press release (section 6.3.2), and the total number of tabs investors view (section 6.3.3).20 
6.3.1 Directed versus Sequential Search Strategy  
My theory suggests that information choice provides investors the flexibility to choose 
the sections and order of information to read within a disclosure. In this section I provide 
evidence that investors viewing a disclosure with high choice actually make choices to view 
information in a directive search manner according to his/her preferred sequence. I create an 
“overall search strategy” measure to capture whether investors use a sequential or directed search 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 I use Mouseflow website tracking to capture the tabs participants view and in what order. Mouseflow did not 
capture tracking information for four participants in the primary conditions or any participants in the additional 
actual mobile device condition. Therefore, I report results only for the primary conditions.  
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strategy. I track the order in which participants view each tab and compare the order of each tab 
view to the order in which the tabs appear on the screen. Each tab view is coded as a 0 if the tab 
immediately precedes or follows the previous tab view, or is coded as a 1 if the tab does not 
immediately precede or follow the previous tab view. The tab view codes are summed for each 
participant and divided by the total number of tabs the participant viewed to arrive at an overall 
search strategy score. A score of 0 indicates an entirely sequential search strategy while a score 
of 1 indicates an entirely directed search strategy. Since participants in no clickable tab 
conditions can only view tabs in sequential order, by design their search strategy must be a 
perfectly sequential value of 0. 
In untabulated results, I examine if investors in high information choice conditions use an 
overall search strategy that differs significantly from a sequential search strategy (i.e. zero). I 
find that investors with high choice on a traditional screen use a search strategy that differs 
significantly from a perfectly sequential search strategy (0.58 > 0.00; t (19) = 5.34, p < 0.001, 
two-tailed). I also find that investors with high choice on a small screen also use a search strategy 
that differs significantly from a perfectly sequential search strategy (0.30 > 0.00, t (25) = 2.83, p 
< 0.01, two-tailed). Finally, I find that investors with high choice on a traditional screen use a 
more directed search strategy than investors with high choice on a small screen (0.58 > 0.30, t 
(48) = 2.51, p = 0.01, two-tailed). This provides evidence consistent with theory that information 
choice provides investors the flexibility to choose the sections and order of information to read 
within a disclosure. I also provide evidence that investors take advantage of that flexibility to a 
greater extent when they view a disclosure with high choice on a traditional screen compared to a 
small screen.  
6.3.2 Direction Changes 
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In the previous section I provide evidence consistent with theory that information choice 
provides investors the flexibility to choose the sections and order of information to read within a 
disclosure. However, the design of my experiment forces investors in no clickable tab conditions 
to view information in a sequential manner. Therefore, in this section I create a “direction 
changes” measure as an alternative measure of search strategy. I track the order in which 
investors view each tab. I code 1 every time a participant changes directions (either forward or 
backward) while reading the press release. The direction changes are summed for each 
participant and divided by the total number of tabs the participant viewed to arrive at an overall 
direction changes measure. Lower (higher) values indicate fewer (more) changes in direction. 
Table 5 Panel A reports cell sizes, means, and standard deviations for direction changes for the 
four primary conditions.  
Table 5 Panel B presents a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for the four 
primary conditions with direction changes as the dependent variable. Results reveal a marginally 
significant information choice by screen size interaction (p = 0.07). Table 5 Panel C presents the 
follow-up simple effects tests. Results show that investors change directions more frequently 
when they view a disclosure with high choice compared to low choice on a traditional screen 
(0.25 > 0.08 direction changes; p < 0.001, two-tailed) or high choice on a small screen (0.25 > 
0.17 direction changes, p = 0.07, two-tailed). However, the number of direction changes does not 
differ when investors view a disclosure with low choice on a small screen compared to high 
choice on a small screen (0.10 = 0.17 direction changes; p = 0.16, two-tailed) or low choice on a 
traditional screen (0.10 = 0.08 direction changes; p = 0.64, two-tailed).  
6.3.3 Total Tabs Viewed 
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Finally, I examine the number of tabs investors view within the disclosure as a measure 
of information search strategy. All investors view all seven tabs within the disclosure, so the 
number of tabs above seven reflects repeated tab views. Table 6 Panel A reports cell sizes, 
means, and standard deviations for total tabs viewed for the four primary conditions.  
Table 6 Panel B presents a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model for the four 
primary conditions with total tabs viewed as the dependent variable. Results reveal a significant 
information choice by screen size interaction (p = 0.05). Table 6 Panel C presents the follow-up 
simple effects tests for the four primary conditions. Results show that investors view 
significantly more tabs when they view a disclosure with high choice compared to a low choice 
on a traditional screen (11.22 tabs > 8.81 tabs; p = 0.02, two-tailed) or high choice on a small 
screen (11.22 tabs > 9.22 tabs; p = 0.05, two-tailed). However, the number of tabs investors view 
does not differ when they view a disclosure with low choice on a small screen compared to high 
choice on a small screen (9.34 tabs = 9.22 tabs; p = 0.90, two-tailed) or low choice on a 
traditional screen (9.34 tabs = 8.81 tabs; p = 0.56, two-tailed).  
In section 5.3.1 I provide evidence that investors exert more effort viewing the press 
release and estimating fundamental value when they view a disclosure with high choice on a 
traditional screen or low choice on small screen. In this section, I provide evidence that investors 
in those conditions differ in their effortful information search strategies. Investors viewing a 
disclosure with high choice on a traditional screen view more tabs and take advantage of the high 
choice by using a directive search strategy to choose the order they view the tabs. Conversely, 
investors viewing a disclosure with low choice on a small screen spend more time viewing each 
tab rather than moving frequently between tabs.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I provide experimental evidence that the influence of information choice on 
investors’ judgments depends on the size of the screen used to view the disclosure. Specifically, 
investors with high choice on a traditional screen exert more effort, so their estimates of 
fundamental value reflect more information integration than investors with low choice on a 
traditional screen. However, information choice combined with a small screen increase 
investors’ processing costs. Therefore, investors with high choice on a small screen exert less 
effort, so their estimates of fundamental value reflect less information integration than investors 
with high choice on a traditional screen or low choice on a small screen. I find the same effect if 
investors view a disclosure with high choice on a small screen manipulated using a box on a 
computer screen or on an actual mobile device.  
 My study has important implications for regulators, managers, and investors. First, 
managers are increasingly providing clickable disclosures for both traditional screen and mobile 
screen access. Further, the SEC is currently promoting disclosure reform initiatives to provide 
clickability within mandated disclosures. My findings caution firms and regulators about 
expanding the use of clickable disclosures without considering the screen size used to access the 
disclosure, especially as more investors use mobile devices to access, read, and trade on financial 
information. My findings also caution investors about performing complex tasks on their phones, 
especially as disclosures increasingly feature clickability. More broadly, my findings have 
important implications in the future as technological advances continue to change the devices 
investors use to access and read financial information. Specifically, creating a functional pairing 
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between screen size and the amount of information choice within disclosures is important for 
investors’ processing of the underlying financial information.  
My study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research. First, I 
limit the amount of information investors receive relative to what is traditionally available on a 
company’s website so that the task could be completed in a reasonable amount of time. This 
reduced information biases against my predictions and suggests that information choice and 
screen size could have a greater impact on investors’ judgments in the natural setting than in my 
study. Second, I focus on investors’ reactions to information choice rather than on management’s 
disclosure choices. Future research can examine how managers might intentionally provide 
information choice to influence investors’ judgments. Third, I use graduate business students as 
proxies for nonprofessional investors. Future research can examine the influence of mobile 
devices on older investors or analysts who may differ in their levels of familiarity with using 
mobile devices to acquire financial information. Finally, I randomly assign participants to a 
condition rather than allowing participants to self-select information display attributes. Variation 
exists in firms providing disclosures with information choice and investors’ familiarity and 
comfort with high choice and small screens. Future research can examine how allowing 
participants to self-select into an information display condition might mitigate or amplify the 
effects I observe. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1  
The Effects of Information Choice and Screen Size on Estimates of Fundamental Value—
Observed Effects  
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Figure 1 graphically represents observed mean values for participants’ estimates of fundamental value. If 
participants integrate information from the press release narrative and financial statements, persistent earnings fell 
short of the prior period. Therefore, lower estimates of fundamental value reflect more information integration. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for estimates of fundamental value. 
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Figure 2  
The Effects of Information Choice and Screen Size on Investors’ Willingness to Pay Price 
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Figure 2 graphically represents observed mean values for investors’ willingness to pay price per share. Investors 
were asked to assume they had inherited $100,000 and to specify maximum prices at which they would invest 50 
percent, 25 percent, 10 percent, or 5 percent of their inheritance in FreshHouse’s stock. Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics for willingness to pay price per share. 
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TABLE 1 
How Information Choice and Screen Size Affect Estimates of Fundamental Value—Tests of H1  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Fundamental Value per Share Mean [std. dev.] 
Screen Size 
Information Choice Traditional Screen Small Screen Small Screen – Actual Mobile Device 
Low Choice 
73.03 
[14.17] 
n = 31 
65.34 
[13.00] 
n = 31 
 
High Choice 
63.84 
[12.12] 
n = 25 
70.89 
[17.29] 
n = 27 
77.10 
[11.03] 
n = 20 
 
Panel B: Two-Way ANOVA Model of Fundamental Value per Share (Excluding Actual Device Condition) 
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Information Choice 54.58 1 54.58 0.27 0.60 
Screen Size 15.40 1 15.40 0.08 0.78 
Information Choice x Screen Size 1,349.45 1 1,349.45 6.70  0.01 
 
Error 
 
21,967.46 
 
109 
 
201.54   !
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects (Excluding Actual Mobile Device Condition) 
Source of Variation  t-stat p-value 
Effect of Information Choice given Traditional Screen  2.40 0.01† 
Effect of Information Choice given Small Screen  1.48 0.07† 
Effect of Screen Size given High Choice  1.78 0.04† 
Effect of Screen Size given Low Choice  2.12    0.04 
 
Panel D: Planned Comparisons of Supplemental Actual Mobile Device Condition 
Comparison:  t-stat p-value 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> High Choice/Traditional Screen 
 
 
3.15 < 0.01† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> Low Choice/Small Screen (Computer) 
 
 
2.96 < 0.01† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> High Choice/Small Screen (Computer) 
 1.50 0.07† !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  Table 1 presents tests of H1. The dependent variable is participants’ estimates of fundamental value per share. 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of these results. Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B presents an 
ANOVA for the primary conditions and Panel C presents follow-up simple effects tests. Finally, Panel D presents 
planned comparisons for the supplemental actual mobile device condition.  
Participants estimated fundamental value by providing the following inputs to a residual earnings model template: 
best estimate of the current year’s net income (i.e., earnings as reported or adjusted), earnings forecasts for four 
subsequent years, cost of capital, and a long-term growth rate for residual earnings. In the experiment, I manipulate 
information choice by providing participants high or low choice over the sections and order of information they 
view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by presenting the press release on a traditional computer size screen 
or a small mobile device size screen.  
† p-values are one-tailed equivalents for directional predictions!
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TABLE 2  
How Information Choice and Screen Size Affect Adjustments to Net Income—Additional Support for H1 
    
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Percentage [Proportion] of Investors who Adjust Current Period Net Income for 
Transitory Gain 
Screen Size 
Information Choice Traditional Screen Small Screen Small Screen— Actual Mobile Device 
Low Choice 
 
35.5% 
[11 / 31] 
 
48.4% 
[15 / 31]  
High Choice 
 
60.0% 
[15 / 25] 
 
37.0% 
[10 / 27] 
30.0% 
[6 / 20] 
    
 
Panel B: Planned Comparisons (Excluding Actual Mobile Device Condition) 
Comparison  !!Statistic  p-value 
High Choice/Traditional Screen > Low Choice/Traditional Screen 
 3.34  0.03† 
High Choice /Small Screen < Low Choice/Small Screen 
 0.76  0.19† 
High Choice/Traditional Screen > High Choice/Small Screen 
 2.74  0.05† 
Low Choice/Traditional Screen vs. Low Choice/Small Screen  1.06  0.30   
 
Panel C: Planned Comparisons of Supplemental Actual Mobile Device Condition 
Comparison: !!Statistic  p-value 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
< High Choice/Traditional Screen  
 
4.02  0.02† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
< Low Choice /Small Screen (Computer)  
 
1.70  0.10† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
< High Choice/Small Screen (Computer)  
 
0.25  0.30† 
    
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Table 2 presents additional support for H1. The dependent variable is the percentage of participants in each 
condition who adjust net income for a transitory gain when estimating fundamental value. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics. Panel B presents planned comparisons for the primary conditions. Panel C presents planned 
comparisons for the supplemental actual mobile device condition. Participants estimated fundamental value by 
providing the following inputs to a residual earnings model template: best estimate of the current year’s net income 
(i.e., earnings as reported or adjusted), earnings forecasts for four subsequent years, cost of capital, and a long-term 
growth rate for residual earnings. In the experiment, I manipulate information choice by providing participants high 
or low choice over the sections and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by 
presenting the press release on a traditional computer size screen or a small mobile device size screen. † p-values are 
one-tailed equivalents for directional predictions 
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TABLE 3  
How Information Choice and Screen Size Affect Effort—Evidence of the Underlying Process 
    
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Time Spent in Seconds Mean [Standard Deviation] 
Screen Size 
Information Choice Traditional Screen Small Screen Small Screen – Actual Mobile Device 
Low Choice 
442.33 
[235.43] 
n = 31 
590.11 
[238.76] 
n = 31 
 
High Choice 
619.46 
[291.98] 
n = 25 
517.13 
[185.02] 
n = 27 
462.88 
[170.34] 
n = 20 
    
 
Panel B: Two-Way ANOVA Model of Time Spent (Excluding Actual Mobile Device Condition) 
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Information Choice 37,412.05 1 37,412.05 0.71 0.40 
Screen Size 40,740.52 1 40,740.52 0.77 0.38 
Information Choice x Screen Size 335,358.40 1 335,358.40 6.40 0.01 
Error 5,734,294.42 109 52,608.21   !
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects (Excluding Actual Mobile Device Condition) 
Source of Variation  t-stat p-value 
Effect of Information Choice given Traditional Screen  2.75 < 0.01† 
Effect of Information Choice given Small Screen  1.16 0.13† 
Effect of Screen Size given High Choice  1.54 0.06† 
Effect of Screen Size given Low Choice  2.43      0.02 
 
Panel D: Planned Comparisons of Supplemental Mobile Device Condition 
Comparison:  t-stat p-value 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> High Choice/Traditional Screen 
 
 
2.26  0.01† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> Low Choice/Small Screen (Computer) 
 
 
1.92  0.03† 
High Choice/Small Screen (Actual Mobile Device)  
> High Choice/Small Screen (Computer) 
 0.80 0.21† 
 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Table 3 presents evidence of the process underlying H1. The dependent variable is participants’ effort proxied by 
time spent reading the disclosure and estimating fundamental value. Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B 
presents an ANOVA for the primary conditions and Panel C presents follow-up simple effects tests. Finally, Panel D 
presents planned comparisons for the supplemental actual mobile device condition.  
In the experiment, I manipulate information choice by providing participants high or low choice over the sections 
and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by presenting the press release on a 
traditional computer size screen or a small mobile device size screen.  
† p-values are one-tailed equivalents for directional predictions  
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TABLE 4 
Supplemental Analysis of Investors’ Willingness to Pay Per Share 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Willingness to Pay Per Share Mean [Standard Deviation] 
 
Information Choice / 
Screen Size N 50% 25% 10% 5% 
High Choice /  
Traditional Screen 25 
$48.89 
[$16.86] 
$53.50 
[$15.48] 
$57.61 
[$14.83] 
$60.91 
[$15.29] 
Low Choice /  
Traditional Screen 29 
$58.23 
[$13.07] 
$62.02 
[$12.68] 
$65.27 
[$13.55] 
$68.29 
[$15.12] 
Low Choice /  
Small Screen 31 
$47.27 
[$18.76] 
$51.51 
[$18.85] 
$55.04 
[$18.97] 
$58.08 
[$19.12] 
High Choice /  
Small Screen 27 
$52.63 
[$15.16] 
$58.28 
[$14.57] 
$63.66 
[$14.41] 
$67.55 
[$15.13] 
 
Panel B: Mixed ANOVA Model of Willingness to Pay Price  
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Between Subjects Source of Variation      
Information Choice 59.55 1 59.55 0.69 0.79 
Screen Size 1,475.13 1 1,475.13 1.71 0.19 
Information Choice x Screen Size 5,116.57 1 5,116.57 5.92 0.02 
Error 
92,469.1
3 107 864.20   
Within Subjects Source of Variation a      
Percentage of Inheritance Invested 8,910.24 1 8,910.24 156.58 < 0.001 
Information Choice x Percentage of Inheritance 
Invested 169.49 1 169.49 2.98 0.09 
Screen Size x Percentage of Inheritance Invested 43.47 1 43.47 0.76 0.38 
Information Choice x Screen Size x Percentage of 
Inheritance Invested 13.08 1 13.08 0.23 0.63 
Error 6,088.96 107 56.91   ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel C: Mixed ANOVA Model of Willingness to Pay Price—Traditional Screen  
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Between Subjects Source of Variation      
Information Choice 1,944.43 1 1,944.43 3.26 0.08 
Error 
30,388.1
6 51 595.85   
Within Subjects Source of Variation a      
 
Percentage of Inheritance Invested 3,681.01 1 3,681.01 71.21 < 0.001 
Information Choice x Percentage of Inheritance 
Invested 42.22 1 42.22 0.82 0.37 
Error 2,636.43 51 51.70   
 
Panel D: Mixed ANOVA Model of Willingness to Pay Price—Small Screen  
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Between Subjects Source of Variation      
Information Choice 3,295.35 1 3,295.35 2.97 0.09 
Error 
62,080.9
6 56 1,108.59   
Within Subjects Source of Variation a      
Percentage of Inheritance Invested 5,351.42 1 5,351.42 86.80 < 0.001 
Information Choice x Percentage of Inheritance 
Invested 145.20 1 145.20 2.36 0.13 
Error 3,452.54 56 61.65   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Table 4 presents evidence of investors’ willingness to pay. The dependent variable is the maximum price per share 
participants would be willing to pay to allocate 50%, 25%, 10%, and 5% of an inheritance. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics. Panel B presents a Mixed ANOVA for traditional screen conditions and Panel C presents a 
Mixed ANOVA for small screen conditions.  
In the experiment, I manipulate information choice by providing participants high or low choice over the sections 
and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by presenting the press release on a 
traditional computer size screen or a small mobile device size screen.  
a Mauchly's test of sphericity indicated the assumption of sphericity has been violated, (x!(5) = 229.63, p < 0.01, 
traditional screen; x!(5) = 239.81, p < 0.01, small screen). This test rejects the null hypothesis that the variances of 
the differences between the levels of the within-subjects factor (i.e. willingness to pay price) are equal. Results are 
inferentially identical when I conduct the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure to correct the degrees of freedom of the F 
test. !
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TABLE 5   
Supplemental Analysis of Information Search Strategies: Forward and Backward Search by Condition 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Direction Changes Mean [Standard Deviation] 
Screen Size 
Information Choice Traditional Screen Small Screen 
Low Choice 
0.08 
[0.12] 
n = 31 
0.10 
 [0.14] 
n = 29 
High Choice 
0.25 
[0.19] 
n = 23 
0.17 
[0.21] 
n = 27 
   
 
Panel B: Two-Way ANOVA Model of Direction Changes   
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Information Choice 0.40 1 0.40 14.61 < 0.001 
Screen Size 0.04 1 0.04 1.52 0.22 
Information Choice x Screen Size 0.09 1 0.09 3.48 0.07 
Error 2.84 105 0.03   !
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects  
Source of Variation  t-stat p-value 
Effect of Information Choice given Traditional Screen  3.71 < 0.01 
Effect of Information Choice given Small Screen  1.40 0.16 
Effect of Screen Size given High Choice  1.85 0.07 
Effect of Screen Size given Low Choice  0.47 0.64 
    
 
 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  
 Table 5 presents evidence of investors’ information search strategy. The dependent variable is the extent to which 
participants change direction forward and backward while reading the press release tabs. I track the order in which 
participants view each tab. I code each change in direction forward or backward as a 1. The direction change codes 
are summed for each participant and divided by the total number of tabs the participant viewed to arrive at an overall 
direction change score. Lower (higher) values indicate fewer (more) changes in direction. 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B presents an ANOVA and Panel C presents follow-up simple effects 
tests.  
In the experiment, I manipulate information choice by providing participants high or low choice over the sections 
and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by presenting the press release on a 
traditional computer size screen or a small mobile device size screen.  
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TABLE 6  
Supplemental Analysis of Information Search Strategies: Number of Tabs Viewed by Condition 
    
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics—Number of Tabs Viewed Mean [Standard Deviation] 
Screen Size 
Information Choice Traditional Screen Small Screen 
Low Choice 
8.81 
[2.55] 
n = 31 
9.34 
[3.18] 
n = 29 
High Choice 
11.22 
[4.94] 
n = 23 
9.22 
[3.65] 
n = 27 
   
 
Panel B: Two-Way ANOVA Model of Tabs Viewed  
Source of Variation SS df MS F-stat p-value 
Information Choice 41.22 1 41.22 3.22 0.08 
Screen Size 18.21 1 18.21 1.42 0.24 
Information Choice x Screen Size 49.77 1 49.77 3.89 0.05 
Error 1,343.38 105 12.79   !
Panel C: Follow-Up Tests of Simple Effects  
Source of Variation  t-stat p-value 
Effect of Information Choice given Traditional Screen  2.44  0.02 
Effect of Information Choice given Small Screen  0.13 0.90 
Effect of Screen Size given High Choice  1.96 0.05 
Effect of Screen Size given Low Choice  0.58 0.56 
    
 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 !Table 6 presents evidence of investors’ information search strategy. The dependent variable is the total number of 
press release tabs viewed within the disclosure. All participants view all seven tabs, so values above seven reflect 
repeated tab views. Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B presents an ANOVA and Panel C presents 
follow-up simple effects tests.  
In the experiment, I manipulate information choice by providing participants high or low choice over the sections 
and order of information they view in a press release. I manipulate screen size by presenting the press release on a 
traditional computer size screen or a small mobile device size screen.  
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APPENDIX A 
EXCERPTS FROM PRESS RELEASES WITH HIGH AND LOW INFORMATION 
CHOICE 
 
Panel A: Microsoft Press Release with High Information Choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Apple Press Release with Low Information Choice 
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APPENDIX B 
EXCERPTS FROM A PRESS RELEASE VIEWED ON A SMALL SCREEN MOBILE 
DEVICE AND TRADITIONAL SCREEN COMPUTER 
  
Panel A: Starbucks Press Release Viewed on a Small Screen Mobile Device 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Starbucks Press Release Viewed on a Traditional Screen Computer 
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APPENDIX C 
MANIPULATIONS 
Panel A: Low Choice (i.e. tabs are not clickable) on Traditional Screen (11.25 inches wide x 
6.5 inches high) Manipulation    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Low Choice (i.e. tabs are not clickable) on a Small Screen (5.44 inches wide x 2.64 
inches high) Manipulation 
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Panel C: High Choice (i.e. tabs are clickable) on a Traditional Screen (11.25 inches wide x 
6.5 inches high) Manipulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: High Choice (i.e. tabs are clickable) on a Small Screen (5.44 inches wide x 2.64 
inches high) Manipulation 
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APPENDIX D  
EXAMPLE OF RESIDUAL EARNINGS MODEL TEMPLATE 
 
!
